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STATE OF UTAH, 5 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 910021-CA 
v. j 
ANTWINE l« I ONER, : Pi i, i i I y M 2 
Defendant-Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is ~* appeal sentence imposed upon 1ty 
]. * and 
'r ^ / (1990). Thi- ' has jurisdiction - appeal 
under Utah Code A- * fSupp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
!• D / ? - * court's reliance on an incomplete 
presentence report, and its apparent misinterpretation of parts of 
that report •< Lolate defendaT i 
of whether the due process limit of the tria 1 court's sentencing 
discretion has been observed is, as more fully developed i n the 
State' s argument 1111 e r i il!: law. See St ale „ J . Sanwick, 
708- 09 (Utah 1986); State v. Carson, 597 P. 2d 864, 864-65 (Utah 
1979). 
2 • 1 " II I I' I l M " l I II i 1 I I ( HI II II I I II I HI I I I I  II i I II I fa I. 1 <•' ! J, I 11 I  I M)r 
sentencing defendant to prison instead of placing him on probation? 
The imposition of a statutorily prescribed sentence will not be 
reversed or modified unless it is clearly excessive or the trial 
court abused its discretion. State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192-
93 (Utah 1990); State v. Kelly, 784 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Gerrard, 584 P. 2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). Similarly, the 
choice between imprisonment and probation also rests in the 
discretion of the trial court. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201(1), 77-
18-1(2) (Supp. 1991); State v. McClendon, 611 P. 2d 728, 730 (Utah 
1980); State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671, 673 (1963); 
State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388 (1957). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution both 
prohibit the State from depriving any person of "life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." Statutory and rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of this case are contained 
in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals the sentence that was imposed pursuant 
to his guilty plea to third degree felony theft, Utah Code Ann. 
SS 76-6-404 and 76-6-412 (1990). Upon consideration of a 
presentence report prepared by the State Division of Adult 
Probation and Parole (AP & P), the trial court sentenced defendant 
to zero to five years imprisonment, as provided for third degree 
felony convictions under Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-203(3) (1990). 
On appeal, defendant argues that the "rap sheet" portion 
of the AP & P presentence report, regarding his prior criminal 
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history, was incomplete and unreliable. He also argues that the 
trial court misinterpreted parts of his rap sheet. As a result of 
these problems, defendant contends that he was given an unfair 
sentence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was originally charged with second degree 
felony burglary of a dwelling and with third degree felony theft 
(R. 6-8J.1 He pleaded guilty to the theft charge on September 14, 
1990, and under a plea agreement, the burglary charge was 
dismissed. When defendant entered his plea, the trial court warned 
him that third degree felonies are punishable by up to five years 
in the state penitentiary plus a fine and restitution, and that 
under defendant's plea, all these penalties could be imposed. 
Defendant stated that he understood this (T. 9/14/90:3-4). 
With the State's consent, defendant was given a 
presentence release to Project Reality, an inpatient facility for 
the treatment of substance abusers (R. 34).2 Also, a presentence 
investigation was conducted by AP & P. 
Sentencing took place on November 30, 1990, after defense 
counsel had been given the opportunity to review the AP & P 
presentence investigation report ("presentence report") (T. 
*Record citations: "R.M refers to the district court record; 
HT." followed by a date refers to one of the three hearings (plea 
hearing plus two sentencing hearings) in the district court. 
2While the State consented to defendant's presentence drug 
rehabilitation treatment, nothing in the record indicates that the 
State ever agreed to recommend probation and treatment in lieu of 
imprisonment for the pleaded offense. 
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11/30/90:3). Noting that the State and the presentence report both 
recommended imprisonment, counsel asked that those recommendations 
not be followed (T. 11/30/90:3), and asked that defendant instead 
be allowed to remain in Project Reality under AP & P supervision 
(T. 11/30/90:7-8). Defendant, counsel, and a Project Reality 
representative stated that defendant had done well in his substance 
abuse treatment, and opined that with continued treatment, 
defendant would not resume criminal activity. Defendant expressed 
a wish to meet his family responsibilities and to "do something 
with my life" (T. 11/30/90:9-11). 
Defense counsel also complained that the presentence 
report was unreliable, because it relied in part upon an incomplete 
wrap sheet" of defendant's past arrests, compiled by the Utah 
Bureau of Criminal Identification.3 For example, the rap sheet 
listed a number of arrests for which no final disposition was 
indicated. Additionally, the report's account of defendant's past 
3The term "rap sheet" is used by the Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation, and refers to the criminal history information 
compiled and maintained by that agency. Utah Admin. Code R726-2-2 
(1990). 
A portion of the presentence report in this case is appended 
to the Brief of Appellant. By stipulation and order of this court 
granted August 6, 1991, the record on appeal has been supplemented 
with the full presentence report. See State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 
1005, 1008 (Utah 1982) (presentence report should be part of record 
on appeal). However, owing to confidentiality considerations, only 
an additional several pages of the presentence report are 
reproduced in this brief. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(5) (Supp. 
1991). Arguments herein relating to the presentence report address 
only the limited portions appearing in the parties' briefs. 
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probation history was allegedly inaccurate (T. 11/30/90:4-5) / 
Counsel reported that his assessment of defendant's history, 
contrary to that of the presentence report, resulted in a "fair" 
criminal history rating, under which a sentence other than 
imprisonment could be recommended (T. 11/30/90:8). 
The trial court agreed that rap sheet information in 
presentence reports is often inaccurate (T. 11/30/90:4). The court 
praised defendant's progress at Project Reality, but stated that 
defendant's criminal record, even when arrests leading to 
acquittals and unknown dispositions were disregarded, was very 
serious (T. 11/30/90:11). The court also stated that defendant had 
never successfully completed his prior probations (T. 11/30/90:11). 
Accordingly, the statutory sentence of zero to five years at the 
Utah State Prison was imposed. 
One week later, on defendant's motion, the trial court 
heard argument that it should reconsider the sentence,5 Defendant 
and counsel again locked horns with the trial court over the 
4Counsel reported that defendant's first probation had ended 
successfully in 1977, that a second probation in 1978 or 1979 had 
been revoked, and that a third probation in 1986 had been 
improperly revoked (T. 11/30/90:4-5). 
^he primary basis for defendant's motion to review the 
sentence was his contention that it was unjust, because one of his 
codefendants had been only sentenced to probation for the crime (R. 
42). While this argument is not pursued in his opening brief, 
defendant's docketing statement frames this contention as an equal 
protection clause-based issue (docketing statement at 3). At the 
December 7 hearing on defendant's motion, the trial court clearly 
stated that the codefendant had received probation only because 
extradition to Colorado on other criminal charges was planned for 
that individual (T. 12/7/90:7). The court also stated that the 
codefendant would not have received probation had it known that the 
Colorado charges would not be pursued (T. 12/7/90:9). 
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magnitude of defendant's criminal record. While acknowledging some 
reluctance to impose a severe sentence for the current crime, the 
trial court opined that defendant's prior record was "terrible,fl 
revealing failed probations and numerous felonies (T. 12/7/90:9). 
Defendant asserted that only two arrests listed in the presentence 
report had resulted in felony convictions. The trial court 
disagreed, and arrived at a total of four felony convictions (T. 
12/7/90:13). Also citing a substantial juvenile record and 
defendant's conviction of another felony subsequent to his arrest 
in this case, the trial court declined to change the sentence (T. 
12/7/90:13-14, R. 44), and this appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Due process in criminal sentencing requires that the 
information used as the basis for sentencing be identified, and 
that the defendant be afforded the opportunity to challenge and 
rebut that information. Those rights were honored in this case, in 
that defendant's challenges to the presentence report were 
considered by the trial court. Additional codified due process 
rights were also exercised by defendant. Defendant also had a 
statutory and regulatory remedy for any inaccuracies in his 
presentence report, and failed to exercise that remedy. No 
misinformation of constitutional magnitude was involved in 
sentencing defendant, who has no substantive right to leniency. 
Ultimately, this case must be reviewed in light of the 
broad discretion afforded to trial courts to impose a criminal 
sentence that is within statutory limits. It is also appropriate, 
upon appellate review of a criminal sentence, to examine all the 
sentencing information provided to the trial court to determine 
6 
whether the sentence imposed is objectively reasonable. So viewed, 
and even acknowledging possible inaccuracies in the information 
used by the trial court as the basis for its sentence, there was no 
abuse of trial court discretion in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS DID NOT VIOLATE 
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
A* Sentencing Hearings are Not Subject to Strict 
Evidentiary Rules. 
Defendant contends that the trial court's use of the 
presentence report in sentencing him was a decision on the 
admissibility of evidence, to be reviewed as a question of law on 
appeal. Even though this statement is sometimes true in the guilt 
phase of a criminal proceeding,6 sentencing proceedings are not 
••evidentiary" in the same degree as those related to the 
determination of guilt. Accordingly, the usual rules of evidence 
do not apply. Utah R. Evid. 1101(b)(3); State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 
707, 709 (Utah 1986). 
M[T]he basic provisions afforded by our law to persons 
accused of crime do not exist in the same manner after he has been 
convicted." State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1978). The 
sentencing court is not trying to determine guilt, but to simply 
make an informed decision as to sentencing. All that is required 
is that sentence not be imposed in total ignorance of the 
6See, e.g., State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 11 (Utah 
1991) (where underlying facts regarding how evidence was obtained 
are established, decision to admit evidence is one of law). 
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defendant's background. State v. Carson, 597 P.2d 862, 864-65 
(Utah 1979). 
The relatively relaxed evidentiary standards for 
sentencing hearings is also reflected in the language of Utah's 
sentencing rules, which allow the use of information other than 
formal evidence. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(5)(b) (Supp. 1991) 
(at sentencing, "court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information . . . , f); Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) ("any information 
material to the imposition of sentence" may be presented). See 
also Sanwick, 713 P.2d at 708 (information from outside the record 
may be considered). 
Finally, to whatever extent a presentence report might be 
considered formal evidence, defendant did not object to or move to 
strike the report in the trial court. Nor did he move to continue 
sentencing pending correction of the allegedly erroneous 
information in the presentence report. Instead, exploiting the 
incomplete nature of the report, he attempted to show that his 
prior criminal record "is not as bad as it appears" (Br. of 
Appellant at 3). Therefore, for the purpose of appeal, defendant 
waived any objection to the trial court's use of the report. State 
v. Johnson, 774 P. 2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (contemporaneous 
objection or specific claim of error must appear in trial court 
record to preserve claim for appellate review); Utah R. Evid. 
103(a)(1) (timely objection required to preserve error on appeal). 
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B. The Sentencing Hearings were Amply Fair. 
Despite the lenient informational standards, procedural 
fairness is required in criminal sentencing. Sanwick, 713 P.2d at 
708. As a matter of due process, certain steps must be observed. 
The question of whether those steps were followed can be answered 
by reviewing the transcripts on record in this case, making this 
issue one of law. 
Due process considerations require that any reports used 
in sentencing be identified as pertaining to the guilty defendant, 
Carson, 597 P.2d at 866, and that the defendant be allowed to 
challenge and attempt to rebut any of the information used in 
sentencing. Sanwick, 713 P.2d at 709; Harris, 585 P.2d at 452. 
These requirements extend to presentence reports, State v. Casarez, 
656 P.2d 1005, 1007-08 (Utah 1982),7 and were met here. 
There is no suggestion that the presentence report in 
this case identified someone other than defendant. The report was 
provided to defendant before sentencing, and he had two hearings in 
which he challenged and attempted to rebut the information in the 
report. 
Utah's law also requires that defendant be allowed, in 
open court, to make his own statement and present his own 
information, including mitigating factors, regarding the punishment 
to be imposed. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(5)(b) (Supp. 1991); Utah 
R. Crim. P. 22(a). Here, defendant both personally challenged the 
7Certain presentence report information may be withheld from 
the defendant if disclosure would threaten the safety of third 
parties. Casarez, 656 P.2d at 1008. 
9 
presentence report and expressed his desire and motivation to 
change his way of life. Information regarding his progress in drug 
rehabilitation was also heard. Clearly, defendant's due process 
and codified rights to be heard at his sentencing proceeding were 
met. 
The trial court also agreed with defendant's contention 
that the rap sheet portion of his presentence report was likely to 
be inaccurate, and agreed to disregard arrests that did not result 
in a finding of guilt. Thus, not only were acquittals and 
dismissals disregarded, but arrests with unrecorded final 
dispositions were also disregarded. In handling the rap sheet in 
this manner, the trial court went beyond what was necessarily 
required of it. In that many rap sheet entries were simply 
incomplete rather than outright wrong, prior arrests that may in 
fact have resulted in convictions were not considered by the trial 
court, to defendant's benefit.8 
C. Defendant Waived a Major Opportunity to 
Correct his Rap Sheet. 
Defendant also had the opportunity to challenge and 
correct his rap sheet directly with the Bureau of Criminal 
Identification. The Bureau is statutorily required to provide for 
such challenges, and has a procedure in place whereby rap sheets 
can be corrected. See Utah Code Ann. 77-26-7(7) (1990); Utah 
Additionally, the presentence report indicates that defendant 
has used at least eleven aliases. The author of the report 
corrected some of the incompleteness of defendant's rap sheet by 
direct research of court records under defendant's aliases. 
However, the use of so many aliases increases the likelihood that 
other past offenses were not found. 
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Admin. Code R726-2-3 through -10 (1990). The record here reflects 
no indication that defendant ever attempted to utilize this 
procedure, even though it was perhaps his best opportunity to 
assure that the trial court had an accurate rap sheet before it. 
This unexplained failure may well amount to a waiver of objections 
to the incompleteness of the rap sheet. At the very least, the 
availability of the procedure to correct his rap sheet represents 
another instance of defendant being provided with ample due process 
protection in his sentencing. 
D. Defendant Had Notice of the Possible 
Sentence When He Entered his Plea, and Has 
Received the Benefit of his Plea Bargain. 
Defendant has expressed disappointment that his 
rehabilitation efforts did not result in probation rather than 
imprisonment (T. 12/7/90:12). His disappointment, however, forms 
no legal basis to complain about his sentence. State v. Plum, 14 
Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671, 673 (1963). Defendant was clearly told 
when he entered his guilty plea that he could, under that plea, be 
subjected to precisely the sentence that was imposed, as well as to 
a fine and restitution. He was thus on full notice of the possible 
consequence of his plea, in accord with due process principles. He 
should not be heard to complain that one consequence of which he 
was warned has now occurred. 
Defendant also received a benefit for his plea bargain. 
When the burglary charge was dismissed, the risk of a second degree 
felony conviction at trial, with the attendant one to fifteen year 
sentence, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (1990), was avoided. In 
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this sense, defendant's complaint that he was unfairly sentenced 
amounts to a demand that he be granted more than he bargained for 
with his plea. Such demand is inappropriate. Having struck a plea 
bargain, with full awareness of the possible consequences of that 
bargain, there is no due process violation in requiring defendant 
to abide by those consequences. 
E. Any Misinformation Used in Sentencing Defendant 
Was Not of Constitutional Magnitude. 
A sentence violates due process when it is meted out in 
reliance on "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." Sanwick, 
713 P.2d at 708 (quoting Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 
556, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 1362 (1980)). 
As applied in this case, "misinformation of 
constitutional magnitude" means assumptions concerning a 
defendant's past criminal record that are materially untrue. 
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741, 68 S. Ct. 1252, 1255 (1948). 
In Townsend, the trial court had openly derided and summarily 
sentenced a defendant who was unrepresented by counsel. In so 
doing, the court recited as past "crimes" three charges, one of 
which had been dismissed, and two others that had led to 
acquittals. Reversing, the Supreme Court decried the "careless or 
designed pronouncement of sentence on a foundation so extensively 
and materially false, which the prisoner had no opportunity to 
correct . . . ." 334 U.S. at 741, 68 S. Ct. at 1255. 
In this case it does appear that the trial court 
partially misinterpreted defendant's past criminal record. One of 
his crimes, brandishing a firearm, was referred to as a felony, 
12 
when it is in fact a class B misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
506 (1990). Some theft-type arrests shown on defendant's rap 
sheet, also apparently identified by the trial court as felony 
convictions, actually show no final disposition. An attempted 
theft conviction does not show whether the conviction was at the 
felony or a misdemeanor level. These errors, however, do not 
warrant reversal of defendant's sentence. 
Unlike the defendant in Townsend, defendant here was 
represented by counsel. As already noted, he was provided with 
full opportunity to challenge and correct the sentencing 
information, and to otherwise make his case for a more lenient 
sentence. He unexplainably failed to make use of one significant 
opportunity to see to it that his rap sheet was accurate. While 
the trial court misinterpreted some of defendant's criminal 
history, it did not mistreat him in the manner of the trial court 
in Townsend, nor did it fail to make a "scrupulous and diligent 
search for truth" in sentencing defendant. 334 U.S. at 741, 68 S. 
Ct. at 1255.9 
And, based on all the information before it, the trial 
court's conclusion that defendant's criminal history is serious was 
simply not materially untrue. The presentence report shows a 
lengthy criminal record, extending back to 1977 as an adult, and to 
9Compare also cases cited in Plum, 378 P.2d at 672 (reversing 
sentences where defendants were unrepresented by counsel or where 
trial court encouraged defendant to make plea bargain, which court 
then rejected); People v. Brown, 91 111. App. 3d 163, 46 111. Dec. 
527, 414 N.E.2d 249 (1980) (inflammatory extraneous information in 
presentence report, apparently relied on by sentencing court). 
13 
1973 as a juvenile.10 The trial court was by no means required to 
consider only past felony convictions in sentencing. Past 
convictions not listed as felonies, and even relatively minor 
offenses, support the trial court's view that defendant's criminal 
history is serious. 
F. Defendant Has No Substantive Right to Leniency. 
Defendant's argument on appeal appears to rest upon a 
premise that absent the most massive and serious past criminal 
record, a convicted defendant has a substantive right to a lenient 
sentence. This premise is incorrect. "[T]here is no principle 
recognized in a court of law that one who would breach the law is 
entitled to a free bite of the apple or to be treated leniently." 
State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah 1981). Had his prior 
record been pristine, defendant still would have no right to 
leniency. See Clark (jail sentence upheld even though defendant 
had stable background and no serious prior criminal record). 
Additionally, even if defendant is correct in his claim 
that AP & P, in its presentence report, miscalculated the severity 
of his criminal history, a more favorable calculation would not 
have entitled him to a more lenient sentence.11 Utah's sentencing 
10The juvenile record may properly be considered as a factor 
in adult sentencing. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404(1)(a) (Supp. 1991); 
State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (1980). 
uDefense counsel's reference in the first sentencing hearing 
to a "fair" criminal history rating under counsel's calculations 
refers to the "Criminal History Assessment" and "General 
Disposition Matrix" found in Utah's Sentence and Release Guidelines 
(1985), Utah Code Jud. Admin., Appendix F. A copy of that matrix 
from defendant's presentence report is appended to this brief. 
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guidelines are simply guidelines, and are not intended to be 
binding on trial courts. See "Guidelines as a Tool," Utah Sentence 
and Release Guidelines (1985), Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, Appendix F (guidelines are intended to maintain 
judicial discretion).12 
Defendant's implicit premise, if accepted, would usurp 
the legislature's authority to assess the seriousness of offenses 
and assign statutory penalties accordingly. See State v. Amicone, 
689 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Utah 1984) (legislature has broad discretion 
to set criminal punishments). The statutory penalty should be the 
presumptive sentence for a convicted defendant, and the defendant 
should bear the burden of convincing the trial court that some 
lesser sentence is appropriate. 
Finally, the notion that sentencing begins with a 
presumption of leniency would erode the sentencing discretion that 
is statutorily and traditionally provided to trial courts. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (Supp. 1991) (trial court may choose 
from variety of sentence options); State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 
192 (Utah 1990), and cases cited therein. Indeed, questions of a 
defendant's remorse for the crime and determination to not repeat 
I2Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 3551 (West, Supp. 1991) (persons 
convicted of federal offenses "shall be sentenced in accordance 
with" federal Sentencing Reform Act); California Penal Code § 
1170(a)(2) (West, Supp. 1991) (courts "shall apply the sentencing 
rules of the Judicial Council"). 
Cases from two other jurisdictions in which sentences were 
vacated although within the range permissible for the offenses also 
involve mandatory sentencing guidelines. See Bumpus v. State, 776 
P.2d 329 (Alaska App. 1989) and Alaska Stat. § 12.55.125(d)(2) 
(1990); State v. Pittman, 54 Wash. App. 58, 772 P.2d 516 (1989) and 
Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.120 (1989). 
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criminal activity also figure into sentencing, and such questions 
are best addressed by the trial court, in its advantaged position 
to observe demeanor and assess credibility. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). The mathematically-based leniency apparently urged by 
defendant would simply not account for this and other relevant 
factors in sentencing. See also State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 
887 (Utah 1978) (sentencing decisions are based in part upon 
personal judgment of trial court); State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 
310 P.2d 388, 393 (1957) (probation is not a matter of right, even 
for one with an "unsullied" record). 
In sum, defendant was provided with all the procedural 
safeguards that were required in sentencing, along with some that 
were not required. He failed to exercise at least one such 
safeguard in his behalf. While the trial court misinterpreted some 
of defendant's criminal history, such misinterpretation did not 
rise to the level of constitutional error. Finally, defendant has 
no substantive right to a lenient sentence. 
POINT II 
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON DEFENDANT DOES NOT 
REPRESENT AN ABUSE OF TRIAL COURT DISCRETION. 
A. The Sentence Was Within Statutory Limits. 
Utah's appellate courts will not disturb a criminal 
sentence "unless it exceeds that prescribed by law or unless the 
trial court abused its discretion." State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 
188, 192 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted). The zero to five year 
sentence imposed in this case was precisely that prescribed for a 
third degree felony, to which defendant pleaded guilty. Utah Code 
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Ann. S 76-3-203(3) (1990). A statutorily authorized fine of up to 
$5000.00 could have also been imposed under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
301 (Supp. 1991), but was not. The sentence was thus well within 
statutory limits. 
B. The Sentence Was Not Clearly Excessive. 
The question of whether a trial court has abused its 
discretion in sentencing is reviewable on an objective 
reasonableness standard, and calls for reversal "only if it can be 
said that no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the 
trial court." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
Under this standard, an abuse of sentencing discretion occurs only 
when the sentence is "clearly excessive" or the court's actions are 
"inherently unfair." Russell, 791 P.2d at 192-93 (quoting Gerrard, 
584 P.2d at 887). While some of the information used as the basis 
for defendant's sentence may have been flawed, an overview of the 
sentencing information here reveals no clearly excessive sentence 
in this case. 
In Russell, the Utah Supreme Court disposed of the 
"clearly excessive" question by noting that the sentence in 
question there did not exceed statutory limits. 791 P.2d at 193. 
Under that criterion, because defendant's sentence in this case was 
within statutory limits, it cannot be considered to be clearly 
excessive. 
Gerrard, however, suggests that a sentence might be 
excessive even if it is within statutory limits. 584 P.2d at 887 
("[T]his court will not reverse or modify a sentence prescribed by 
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law unless it is clearly excessive . . . " ) . Even if a statutorily 
prescribed sentence that is not cruel and unusual can still somehow 
be excessive, there was no excessive sentence here.13 
In contesting the accuracy of his rap sheet, defendant 
admitted two prior felony convictions. He also admitted three 
prior probations, one of which he agrees ended in a proper 
revocation (Br. of Appellant at 9). Again, even if defendant's 
characterization of his past record would support a recommendation 
of a penalty other than imprisonment under Utah's sentencing 
guidelines, such a recommendation would not have been binding on 
the trial court. In its discretion, the court could well have 
determined that defendant's admitted past history reflects a person 
who has failed to rehabilitate himself despite past correctional 
efforts, and should therefore be incarcerated for the current 
felony.14 
C. The Trial Court's Action in Sentencing 
Defendant Was Not Inherently Unfair. 
Inasmuch as the "inherent unfairness" examination for an 
abuse of sentencing discretion implies an analysis of the 
sentencing procedure, such analysis has been done under the due 
13Defendant does not argue that his sentence amounts to cruel 
and unusual punishment. 
^Indeed, even if defendant had completed all of his probations 
without incident, this would not mean that those probations had 
been "successful" in the long term. Instead, those probations were 
unsuccessful, in that despite the leniency and supervision history 
suggested by past probation, defendant nevertheless went on to 
repeat criminal behavior. 
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process argument of this brief* To recap that argument, the 
State's position is that defendant was given a full and fair 
opportunity to make his case for leniency, that his sentence was 
the sentence he bargained for, and that misinformation derived from 
defendant's rap sheet was not of reversible magnitude* 
While defendant's admitted record alone supports the 
sentence, other factors not expressly articulated by the trial 
court also support the sentence. For example, the presentence 
report recites the assessments of two law enforcement officers to 
the effect that defendant does not appear to have learned from his 
past mistakes, and that he is generally recalcitrant in his 
criminal behavior. This permissible hearsay information, State v. 
Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1986), supports imprisonment. 
And, as already noted, the length of defendant's criminal history 
and crimes other than felonies were proper considerations in 
sentencing. 
Additionally, in choosing between probation and 
imprisonment for a convicted defendant, the trial court may 
properly consider "intangibles of character, personality and 
attitude, of which the cold record gives little inkling." State v. 
Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P-2d 388, 393 (1957). Here, even though 
defendant expressed a desire to rehabilitate himself, the trial 
court could have properly concluded that defendant's wishes, even 
if sincere, simply represented efforts that were "too little and 
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too late." 
Finally, even if some misinformation was involved in 
defendant's sentencing, reversal or remand would only be 
appropriate "if it were clearly shown that the trial judge would 
have granted probation except for some wholly irrelevant, improper 
or inconsequential consideration • . . ." Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393 
(quoted in State v. Carson, 597 P.2d 862, 865 (Utah 1979)). In 
this case, defendant has at best shown some ground to speculate 
that, had it used more accurate information, the trial court might 
have imposed a different sentence. Such speculation falls far 
short of the clear showing that must be made to establish an abuse 
of sentencing discretion by the trial court. And, in the end, 
defendant's speculation is further weakened by the presence of 
abundant information, quite apart from alleged inaccuracies in his 
rap sheet, that supports the sentence. 
This sentence cannot be excessive whether measured by its 
statutory limits or by some hypothetical more restrictive 
boundaries within the statutory punishment for his crime. Nor does 
the sentence arise from inherently unfair action by the trial 
court, given that defendant's due process rights were honored and 
that ample information other than that complained of by defendant 
on appeal supports the sentence. Therefore, no abuse of discretion 
in sentencing has been shown. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's imposition 
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of sentence in this case should be affirmed. 
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APPENDIX 
(Excerpts from Presentence Investigation Report on Defendant, 
including Criminal History Assessment and General Disposition 
Matrix) 
PAUfc I H I H I 6 E N 
JONES, ANTWINE 
A G E N C Y R E C O M M E N D A T I O N 
The Risk/Needs Assessment places the defendant within the MAXIMUM range. The staff 
of the Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, respectfully recommends 
the defendant not be placed on probation, but rather, he be committed to the Utah State 
Prison. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEVE MERCER, INVESTIGATOR 
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